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discussionand criticalcomment. Referencesin publicationsto InternationalFinanceDiscussion
Papers (otherthan an acknowledgment thatthe writer has had accessto unpublishedmaterial)should
be clearedwiththe authoror authors.ABSTRACT
This paper examines the dynamic relationship between changesin the finds rate and
nonborrowedreserveswithina reducedform framework that allows the relationship to have
WO distinct patterns over time. A regime switching model a la Hamilton (1989) is estimated.
On average, CPI inflation has been significantly higher in the regime
and volatile changes in funds rate. Innovations in money growth are
characterizedby large
associatedwith a strong
anticipated inflation effect in this high inflation regime, and a moderate liquidity effect in the
low inflation regime. Furthermore, an identical money innovation generates a much bigger
increase in the interest rate during a transition period from the low to high inflation regime
than during a steady high inflation period. This accords well with economic intuition since
the transition period is when the anticipated inflation effect initially gets incorporated into the
interest rate. The converse also holds. That is, the liquidity effect becomes stronger when the
economy leaves a high inflation regime period and enters a low inflation regime period.
.
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Introduction
Many recent studies document a great deal of instability in the observed strength of
the liquidity effect--i.e., the negative dynamic relationship between nominal interest rates and
monetary aggregates (e.g., Thornton, 1988, Leeper and Gordon, 1992). Along with the
particular monetary aggregate used, the sample period emerges as a crucial factor in
determining the strength of the estimated liquidity effect. Even in studies with affirmative
findings, there is evidence suggesting instability in the relationship seen in empirical models
of conventiOnal, as well as new, varieties. As a result, some researchers pay close attention
to the sample period. For example, this concern could be a key reason why some limit the
sample of their study to a short, particular period, rather than usinga longersample(e.g.,
Leeperand Gordon(1993)).2
1Theauthorisan economistinthe Divisionof InternationalFinance,FederalReserveBoard,andthe
FederalReserveBankof SanFrancisco. IwouldliketothankseminarparticipantsattheFederalReserve
Bankof San Francisco,the Boardof Governors,the Fall 1995SystemConferenceon Macroeconomics,
andthe BankofKorea,aswellasJohnJudd,KenKas~ GlennRudebusch,TomSargent,MichaelBoldin,
PhilipJefferson,and Jon Faustfor helpfulcommentsand suggestions. JudyKimprovidedableresearch
assistance. Any remainingerrorsare my own. Theviewsexpressedhere arethoseof the authoranddo
notnecessarilyreflectthoseof the FederalReserveBankof San Franciscoor the Boardof Governorsof
the FederalReserveSystem. Pleaseaddresscorrespondenceto: Chan Huh,Mail Stop#23,Divisionof
InternationalFinance,Boardof Governorsof the FederalReserveSystem,Washington,DC 20551. E-
mail: huhc@frb.gov,tel.:202-452-2296.
2 Mishkin (1981) finds instability in the coefficients of the model used in testing a negative
relationshipbetween the unanticipatedparts of the short-term interest rate and monetary aggregates.
Thornton’s(1988)resultsuggestsheteroskedasticity.Eichenbaumand Christian (1992),andChristian
(1994)offer a similarobservationregardingthe “moneysupply”equationusedto netoutthe anticipated
componentof changein the monetaryaggregates. Pagan and Robertson(1994)documentthe presence
1This study,therefore,focuseson the observation
influenceon estimatesof the liquidityeffect. Applying
that the sampleperiodhas a critical
the stochasticregimechangingmodel
developedby Hamilton(1989),I estimatea bivariateregressionequationof interestratesand “
reservesthat allows for potentialsystematicshiftsin the relationshipacrossdifferentperiods.
This paperinvestigatesthe potentialinfluenceof suchregimeson measuresof the liquidity
effect. Findingevidenceof a systematicand significantshifi in the relationship




in inflation momentum over time are conjectured to be an
potential shifis in the interest rate-reserves relationship.3




effect,nominalinterestrates partlyreflectanticipatedinflation. Thus,the inflationary
momentumshouldinfluencethe extentto whichthe anticipatedinflationcomponent
dominatesmovements
monetaryaggregates.4
in observed nominal interest rates in response to changes in some
The federaltids rate (FYFF)and nonborrowedreserves(NBR)are usedin this
of ARCHintheresidualsof the equationsof theVARsystemusedto examineimpulseresponsesforthe
liquidityeffect.
3Shifisin inflationarymomentumcouldarisedueto severalreasonsthatare notmutuallyexclusive.
Theyare; (i) changesinthe inflationarytendencyof monetarypolicy,(ii) inflationaryimpulsescoming
from supplyshocks,and (iii) changesin marketparticipants’viewsof the inflationtrend.
4See,Fuerst(1992),Christian and Eichenbaum(1992),Coleman,Gilles,and Labadie(1992, 1994)
for examplesof a flexibleprice generalequilibriummodelingapproachto the liquidityeffect. Theirsis
a cash-in-advanceframeworkwith segmented(financialandgoods)markets. A liquiditypremiumarises
becausemoney is valueddifferently in the financialmarketthan in the goodsmarket.
.
LeRoy (1984) offers a model with a money-in-the-utilityfunction specification,in which the
existenceof a liquidityeffect criticallydepends on the serial correlationpropertiesof the exogenous
money injections. A changein the currentmoneysupplywill havedifferenteffectsdependingon what “
is expectedto follow in subsequentperiods. .
2study. Thereis a long list of papersthat focuson these two variables(forexample,Strongin
(1989),Christian and Eichenbaum(1992),Christian, Eichenbaumand Evans(1994),and
Hamilton(1994)). Here,however,I relaxthe usual singleregimeassumptionof the existing
literatureand insteadestimatereducedformequationsof interestratesand reservesakinto
Mishkin(1982),addingthe stochasticregimeshifting feature.5 Then,I ex~ine whetherthere
is a noticeablechangein
model is estimatedusing
extant findings of the empirical liquidity effect literature.b The
first difference monthly data for the 1963-1993 sample period.
The ‘unanticipated’ growthrate of NBR, as derivedin Mishkin(1982),is used as the money
measureand it will be referredas unbr.
Resultsindicatethat the regimeswitchingmodel fits the databetterthan a single
regimemodel. The two disjointsampleperiods,each best describedby the two regime
specificmodels,differin termsof averagechangein the interestrate and moneygrowth,as
well as the volatilityof the ratechanges. Moreimportantly,the historicalCPI inflationrate
has been significantlyhigherduringperiodsdominatedby a largeraveragechangeand more
volatileregime. Basedon this, the two regimeswill be referredto as the high or low
inflationregimes. The 1970sand early’80sshowa greaterconcentrationof high inflation
regimes.
‘Thus,this modelmightbe regardedas a two-stateversionof the singleequationmodelof Mishkin
(1982). There has been progressin empiricalliquidityeffect literaturesinceearly 1980as shown,for
example,in Paganand Robertson(1995). However,the possibilityof a systematicchangein regimesas
modelled in this paper has not been considered. Since this work is in the spirit of a preliminary
investigationon the importanceof regimeswitching,a singleequationframeworkis adopted.
‘Jefferson(1994)appliesasimilarregimeswitchingframeworkto issuesofmonetarypolicy.However,
his focus is on assessing various qualitativeindexes of policy stance. For general applicationssee
Hamilton(1989, 1994), Filardo(1994),Boldin(1992), Kim (1994),and Ammer and Brunner(1994).
3Interestrate responsesto an innovationin moneygrowthin the two regimesclearly
diverge. The low inflationregimeis associatedwith a more significantnegativeshort-run
comovementbetweenthe interestrate and unbr (i.e., liquidityeffect). In response to an
innovation in reserve growth, cumulative changes in the interest rate remain negative for ten
months in the low inflation regime. In other words, in a regime of low inflation, the interest
rate will remain below the level it was at before the initial period for at least ten months
following a positive unbr shock.
In contrast,in a regimeof high inflationthe overallimpactof a reserveinnovation
will be counteredquicklyand will thus be more short-lived. For the same innovation,the
interestrate rises sharplyabovethe initiallevelwithinfour monthsof the initialperiod. This
appearsto illustratean overwhelminganticipatedinflationeffect,in contrastto the modest
liquidity effect seen in low inflation periods.
An examination of dynamic properties of the estimated
switching periods indeed yields economically sensible results.
modelaroundregime
It showsthe interestrate rising
by a largeamountas the economyentersa high inflation(regime)period
inflationperiodfor awhile. That is, the net increasein the rate
moneyduringsuch a transitionperiodis muchbiggerthan that
inflationsampleperiod. This is intuitivebecausethe transition
following
afier beingin a low
an innovationin
seenfor a persistentlyhigh
periodis when thereis an
increasein inflationarymomentumas the resultof both a higherinflationexpectationand
inflationrisk premia gettinginitiallyincorporatedinto interestrates. The converseholds,i.e.,
the interestrate falls by a largeamountas the economyenters into a low inflation(regime)periodafter being
it is reasonableto
in a high inflationperiodfor awhile.7This observationfurthersuggeststhat
associateidentifiedregimeperiodswith high and low inflation.
Suchdisparatedynamicresponsesof the interestrate acrossthe two regimescould
explainwhy studiesusing differentsampleperiodsfind positive,as well as negative,
comovementpatternsbetweenmoneyand interestrates.A relativelylargeconcentrationof
observationsfroma particularregimecouldinfluencethe characteristicsof the liquidity
effect. For example,Paganand Robertson(1994)documentsuch a disparityin impulse
responsesof the fundsrate to a nonborrowedreserveshockfor differentsampleperiods.
They foundthat the size of the bouncebackin the tids rate followingan initialnegative
responseto be muchlargerfor the samplefrom 1974to 1993,comparedto that of the 1959
to 1993sample. In the shortersample,the sizeof the bouncebackwas even largerthanthe
initialfall in the rate. Characteristicsof the shortersamplemight reflectthose of high
inflationregimeobservations,whichmakeup a largerproportionof the fill samplein the
post-1974period.
Finally,the goalof the exercisesin this paperis to documentregimeswitchesin data
rather than to examine why and how the regimes switch. However, this paper’s finding
naturally raises a second set of questions. In that regard, any suggestion given here is
speculative. For instance, one cannot interpret each regime as unambiguously capturing the
7Considerhvo distinct histories.In the first, a low inflationregime prevails before and afier the
reserve innovation. In the second history,the economyremains in a high inflationregime up to the
innovationdatet, then switchesto andremainsin a low inflationregimethereafter. It turnsoutthatthe
magnitudeofthecumulativefall intheinterestrateofhistorytwo ismuchlargerthanthatof historyone.
Thisdifferencecanbethoughtofasanaddedbenefit(deflationarybonus)whentheregimeswitchesfrom
a highto low inflationtype. Conversely,thereseemsto bean inflationpenalty. That is,the interestrate
increaseassociatedwith the low to high inflationregimeswitch is biggerthan that associatedwith the
scenariowhere a high inflationregimepersiststhroughout.
5monetarypolicystance,i.e., shifis in the reservesupplycurve. However,shifis in inflation
momentumovertime do appearto be an importantunderlyingfactorbehindshifis in the
interestrate-reservesrelationship. Furtherstudy,with a moreelaborateidentificationscheme,
mightyield informativeresults.
SectionsII and III offera descriptionof the modelandestimationresults. Dynamic
responsesof the interestrate to an innovationin moneygrowthfor each regime are examined
in SectionIV. SectionV offersa briefdiscussionof the findingsand SectionVI concludes.
II. Model Specification





Here r denoteschangesin interestrate and unbr denotesunanticipatedgrowthin money. St
is the regimeindex,indicatingwhatregimeis in place in periodt. Boththe averagelevelof
~(i.e.,~~)~d its interaction with its own lags and monetary aggregates depend on the regime
in placeat any givenperiodt
normaldistributionswith zero
dependent(i.e.,~(s)’s). Thus,
(i.e.,P(S,)’S).The errortermsare assumedto be fromtwo
means,and the varianceof eachdistributionis regime
heteroskedasticityis a propertyof the model. The cument
regime S, is assumed to be unobservable, but agents can draw probabilistic inferences. That
6is, agentscan calculateP(S1 ) giventhe historiesof the observablevariablesr and unbr. Two
types of regimes are posited, type H and type L. Switches between the two are assumed to
be governed by the following two-state Markov process with constant transition probabilities;
prob(S, =L ISt-l =L) =p,
prob(Sl =H IS1-l =L) = 1-p,
prob(S~ =H IS,-l =H) =q,
and
Prob(S, =L IS,-l =H) = 1-q.
This regimeswitchingpropertyis the main imovation of the modelin this paper.
The moneyvariable(unbr) used in the estimationis the unanticipatedchangein
moneyderivedalongthe line of Mishkin(1982).
That is,
unbrt = Anbrt - Anbrte
where
Anbrte =E( Anbrt Ixt_~)
and
x- , ~=(A ip,-i, AcPi,-i,Art_i,Anbrt.i ~i =1,2,3,....).
To be specific, the anticipated monthly growth in NBR for each period is obtained by
7regressingit on the informationset consistingof six laggedvaluesof the growthrate of
industrialproduction,CPI inflation,changesin the fundsrate,andthe growthrate of NBR.8
Figure 1intuitivelydescribesthe reservemarketsituationthat is envisionedb}’the
currenttwo regimemodel.9 Supposethat the nonborrowedreservesupplyis inelasticbut can
shifi betweentwo levels,H and L. Also supposethat there are two distinctdemandsfor the
reservesof H and L. Overtime,we will observemarketclearingpairsof nonborrowed
resemesand the tids ratesas boththe supplyand demandare buffetedby respectiveshocks.
Furthermore,the observeddata will likely formtwo distinctclusters. Supposethe two
followingconditionsare met. First,eachregimeis sufficientlypersistentso that we will have
a numberof observations,contiguousin time. that are generatedundersimilarcircumstances.
At the sametime a shifi betweenthe two regimesoccursfrequentlyenoughso that we will
have a reasonablenumberof observationsfor eachregimeperiod. Oncetheseconditionsare
met. the dichotomyschemeadoptedhere will fit the data better.
*Strictiyspeaking,this procedureinvolvesthe assumptionthatthe contemporaneousmoneydemand
factorsare not important. Nonetheless,the focusof the paperisto examinea divergenceinthe bivariate
dynamicpatterns,orthe liquidityeffect. Thus,forexpositionalpurposesthisassumptionisretained. The
currentmodelwillhavea betterchanceof capturingthegeneraltendenciesofthe interactionbetweenthe
fundsrateand the reserveat two distinctintersectionpointsif suchshifisoccurreasonablyfrequently.
i
9Weare ignoringthe borrowedcomponentin total reservesfor reasonsof brevity.
8111.Estimation Results
Twoversionsof (1) are estimatedusingthe numericalmaximumlikelihoodmethod
describedin Hamilton(1994). The first specificationassumesthat there is a distinctshifi in
the averagerate of changein r acrossthe two regimes, i.e., P,(H) > p,(L). However, no such
restriction of a distinct shifi is imposed on unbr. The second specification, shown below,
imposes that both the timing of the regime shifi and the magnitude of average rates of
changes in each regime be identical for r and unbr.
4 3
r, = V,(St) + ~ ~!(st) [r, _j - V(St-j)] + ~ ~~(st) (unbrt-i - ~(sr-i)] + Et(st) .
j= 1 j=0
The modelsare estimatedusing firstdifference monthlydataon FYFF,and urzbr,
whereboth seriesare measuredby their monthlyaverages. ]o Estimationresultsare givenin
Tables 1and 2 for modelsI (the first specification)and II (the secondspecification).
Standarderrorsof estimatedcoefficientsare givenin parentheses.
Beforegoingfurther.we needto addressthe questionof whetheror not the two
regimespecificationversusa singleregimealternativeis most appropriate.This is doneby
‘“Thesampleperiod is from 1963:1to 1993:12andthe serieswere transformedas follows. First,~
= 1og(1+ ~100)*100, thenr,= (R-K.,)*1O. Fornonbomowedresenes (’NBR), nbrt=log(NBVB&-
,)*100. The innovations(unbr’s)in NBR are derived by regressing nbr, on the variables shownin (2).
Theregressionwas run recursivelywiththe startingdateof 1959:6. This ensuresthat the estimationof
(1) for periodt does not involveany informationbeyondperiodt. This procedurecould give rise to a
generatedregressorproblemand hencethe standarderrorsof theestimatedcoefficientscouldunderstate
the true extent of uncertainty. However, results do not change perceptiblywhen equation (1) was
estimatedusingtheactualchangesinnonborrowedreservesinsteadoftheunanticipatedmoneyofequation
(2) (Huh (1995)).
9usingthe likelihoodratiotest of the two specificationsas suggestedby Garcia(1992).’1This
test overwhelminglyrejectsthe singleregimenull hypothesis.lz D
A negativecomovementpatternbetweenr and unbr, (i.e., the liquidity effect) holds in
both regimes. For model I (Table 1) the coefficients on contemporaneous money growth are
significantly negative for both regimes. A negative contemporaneous comovement is more
pronounced in regime L (significant at 1 percent) than in regime H (significant at 5 percent)
for model I. In model 11,the contemporaneous coefficient is significant only in regime L (at
1percent). A negativeeffectpersistsevenafier one monthin regime L, but not in regimeH
(i.e., ~’mis significantat 10percent)for modelI. A furtherdiscussionof the dynamic
responseof the interestrate to a changein moneywill be given later.
Figure2 plotsthe inferredprobabilitythat regimeH was in place in any givenmonth
basedon informationup to eachperiod. This is basedon model1. Data generatedfromthe
other specification(modelII) does not differ
duringseveralperiods. The most noticeable
sampleperiodof 1973-75is also prominent.
1969-70.1984-85,and early 1987.
much. Regime H seemsto have beendominant
is the sample period from 1979 to 1982. The
RegimeH has been in threeadditionalperiods,
To see if thereis a systematiclink betweeninflationand eachof the two regimes,
Figure 3 showsannualCPI inflation(a 7 monthmovingaverageof annualizedmonthly
‘lThesingleregimemodelis notidentifiedunderthe nullhypothesisandconsequentlythe likelihood
ratio has a non-standardChi-squaredistribution.For more discussion see Garcia (1992) and Hansen
(1993). .
12The differenceinthelikelihood functionvaluesis large. For ModelI, the likelihoodvalue for a
single regimeversionwas 714 compared with 594.7 from Table 1. This strongiy suggests that the four
lag specification is a very poor one for single regime models. For example, the value falls to 670 from
710 when 12 lags are included.
.
10changesin CPI)along withthe infemedprobabilityof regimeH. There is a high degreeof
coherencebetweenthe actualhigh inflationperiodsand regimeH periods. Withthe
exceptionof the 1984-85interval,eachregimeH periodcoincideswith a rising or peaking
CPI inflation.
To be more specific,regimespecificsamplesare constructed basedon whetherP(S(t)
= H), shownin Figure2, is greater than 0.5 or not. The
belonging to regime L (290 outof the total 365 months)
averageCPI inflationfor periods
was 4.29percent. On the other
hand,the averagefor the 75 monthsbelongingto the type H regimewas 8.31percent. The
standarderrorsfor each periodare 2.2 (type L) and 3.2 (typeH). Averagegrowthin money
dividedintotwo subsamplesexhibitsa similardivergencein characteristics. Averagegrowth
in nonbomowedreservesduringthe regimeH period is 2.8 times larger than in regime L.
Withregardto the variabilitymeasuredin termsof standarderrorsof growthrates,it is 1.5
times morevolatilein regimeH than in regimeL periods. Results
averagechangein the interestrate is associatedwith a significantly
02(H) > az(L).
also indicatethat a larger
largervariability. Thatis,
The estimatesof the transitionprobabilities(p’sand q’s)suggestthat the low inflation
regimehas been about 10percentmorepersistent.Overall,regimeL has been moreprevalent
than regimeH in the period between 1964-1993. The expected durations are 39 and 10
months for L and H regimes,respectively. ]3
13Because the model is specifiedin terms of changesin the interestrate, it is conceivablethat the
modelmightidenti~ periodsduringwhichthe interestrate is raisedfrom 1 to 2 percent as belonging to
the high inflation regime! This wouldbeabsurdbasedon historicalexperiencewhich suggeststhatsuch
lowfundsrateswouldbecompatibleonlywithverylowinflation.However,itisalsohistoricallythecase
that the funds rate is not changedby a largeamountduring periodsof low and stable inflation. For
example,therangesofchangeinthefundsrate(measuredinbasispoints)duringregimeLandH periods
11IV. Dynamic Effect of Reserve Intervention on the Interest Rate
1. Regime SpecificResponses
A clearerdivergencebetweenthe two regimesemergeswhenwe examinetheir
dynamicproperties. The quantitative experiment involves tracing effects of equal reserve
interventions for each regime over time. We will use model I as the example. Due to the
regime switching structure of the models, dynamic responses crucially depend on which
regime is in place at period t, the period when the reserve imovation takes place.
same regime for five months
Furthermore,in tracingtheseeffects,we have to allow for the possibilityof regimeswitching
over time.
First,we assumethat the economyhas been in the
(periodt-4 throughperiodt) withno innovationin the moneysupply(~nb~i= O,i =t-4,..t-l).14
Then,we subjectthe economyto a one-timeimovation in money(i.e., unbrt>O) andtraceout
paths of interestrate responses.
SupposeregimeH is in placein periodt. Then thereare two possiblevaluesfor r in
are respectively[-70, 73] and [-265,305]. These rangesdo not incfudeextremevaluesat eitherends.
Tworegimeperiodsareidentifiedinthe samewayas inthetext. Forthesampleperiodusedinthestudy,
the hypotheticalcase of seeinga largechange in the interestrate when inflationis lowand stabledoes
not exist. Furthermore, the size of rate change is only part of the properties used for regime
determination.Thus,thispotentialpitfallof themodelspecification doesnotposea problemforthe
currentanalysis.
“T0 be more precise,the interestrate responsesalso depend uponthe relevantpast historyof the -
regimes. SupposethatweareinregimeH in periodt when there is a surpriseincreasein nonborrowed
reserves. The shapeof the interestrate responsesto this shock in future periods(i.e., t+l. t+2,...)will
dependon howwe arrivedinperiodt, orthe pastrealizationsoftheregimes. Thatis,theresponseofthe .
interestratewhenS(t-4)=H,S(t-3)=H,S(t-2)=H.andS(t-1)=HwillbedifferentfromthatwhenS(t-4)=H.
S(t-3)=H, S(t-2)=L,and S(t-l)=L. For simplicity,this complicationwill not be considered.
.
12periodt+l for each of the possibleregimes,i.e., r~+[ (S(t+l) = H IS(t) = H) and rl+,(S(t+l)
= L IS(t) = H). Giventhat regime H is in periodt, the probabilitiesfor eachof the two
valuesare q and l-q, respectively. Sincethe regimecan shifi in eachperiod,thereare 2k
distinctpathsalong whichr responsecan evolvek periodshence. For each of thesepaths,
we canassignprobabilitiesconditionalon the regimeof periodt. Furthermore,we can
determinethe most likelypath by findingan outcomewith the highestprobabilityof
occurringin each period. For the estimated values of p and q and for k less than 31, the
most likely sequence of regimes over time is S(t) = S(t+l) = S(t+2)= .... = S(t+k)= H. This
path has the largestprobabilityof qkof all sequenceswith the lengthk whenregimeH is in
the initial period.15 Similarly, the most likely sequence of regimes over time is S(t) = S(t+l)
= s(t+2) = .... = S(t+k)= L, when period t regime is L. This event has the largest
conditional probability p ‘.
Figure 4 shows the cumulative changes in r in response to a unbr shockfor eachcase
describedabove. The shock is assumed to be one-time, that is, growth in money is held to
zero before and afier period t. Its size is 2 x o~(H), i.e., two times the standard error of
growth in nonbon-owed reserves in the historical regime H sample period. The standard error
is 2.11percent.
The responsesof changesin the interestrate in the two regimesclearlydiverge. A
IsThiscan be shown as fo[lows: Since both p and q are greater than 0.5, q k> q ‘-1(l-q). The former
is the probability that regimeH remainsthroughoutk periodsstartingin t. However,p is greaterthan
q accordingto the estimatesshown in Table3. Thus, it is possiblethat the probabilityassociatedwith
the event that the regime is switched from H to L early on and the economy remains in regime L
thereafterwould be greaterthan that of the eventof regimeH remainingin placethroughoutk periods.
Themostlylikelycandidateiswhenthe switchfromH to L occursin periodt+l and regimeL remains
thereafter. The associatedprobabilityis (l-q) p ‘-l. It turnsout that qkis greaterthan (l-q) pk” for k
lessthan 31, for the estimatedva[uesof p and q.
.
13negativeinterest rate response lasts less than three months in regime H, then gets reversed.
The relative size of responses for each regime is misleading because they are not adjusted for
estimation uncertainty. For example, confidence intervals constructed allowing for 1.5 times -
the standard error of each coefficient for the first two periods for regime H are [0.29, -10.06], .
[8.46, -9.30] and for regime L, [-0.02, -1.41] and [-0.41, -3.14].16 That is. for regime H, the
confidenceintervalfor the responseof r in the
hand, similar confidence bands of r for regime
Startingin the fourthmonthafierthe initial shock,
the initiallevel. That is, the cumulativechangein
initialperiod includes






the interestrate startsnslng sharplyabove
the interest rate turns positive. In contrast,
the cumulativechangesin the interestrate remainnegativefor ten monthsin regimeL. In
otherwords,the interestrate will remainbelowthe levelit was at beforethe initialperiodfor
at leastten monthsfollowingthe unexpectedincreasein nonborrowedreserves. Theduration
of the liquidityeffectis at leastthreetimes longerin the regimeL periodcomparedto regime
H. The overallimpactof a reserveinnovationwill be counteredquicklyand thuswill be
more short-livedin regimeH than in regime L. The fomer appearsto illustratean
overwhelminganticipatedinflationeffect. in contrastto the modestliquidityeffectseenin the
low inflationperiods. Thus, it is not surprisingthat studiesusingdifferentsampleperiods
find both positiveand negativecomovementpatternsbetweenmoneyand interestrates.
This obsemationconfirmsa findingregardingthe impulseresponsepatternbetween
‘bTheupperand lowerboundsfor regime S are calculatedas follows:
upper(S)= (zinbr) x (~O~(S)+1.5x s.e.(~O~(S)))+ v(S),
and
lower(S)= (unbr) x (~O~(S)- 1.5x s.e.(~O~(S)))+ P(S).
The choiceof the 5 YO confidencelevelcriteriaand the emorbandconstructionare somewhatarbitrary.
This analysis is meantto be suggestive.
.
14.
the fundsrateand nonbonowedreservesby Paganand Robertson(1994). In responseto an
innovationin reserves,the fundsrate initiallyfalls,but is shortlyfollowedby a bounceback.
They findthe sizeof this bouncebackto be muchlargerfor the samplefrom 1974to 1993,
comparedto thatof the 1959to 1993sample. Remarkably,the sizeof the bouncebackis
largerthanthe initialfall in the rate of the first sample.”
A highbounceback
the post-1974samplehas a
is a distinctcharacteristicof regimeH. Accordingto Figure2,
high concentrationof observationsbelongingto the high inflation
regimecomparedto the earlierperiod. Thus,as a whole,the latter sampleperiodwould
exhibitmoreregimeH patternsthan the 1959-1993sample. It is interestingto note thatthe
reducedformequationcould capturepropertiesidentifiedby a morefully specified




analysisso far focuseson caseswhenone regimepersists. Further
examinationof dynamicresponsesof the interestrate in caseswhenregimes
yields interestingresults. Thoughthis paper’sanaiysisdoesnot explainwhy
switchalso
regimeswitches
occur,it doesofferan insighton whathappenswhenthe regimeswitchestake place. We
then use this to see whetherthe estimatedmodelis economicallysensible.
Supposethat the economyhas beenin a low inflationregime,or regime L for awhile.
Furthermore,the monetaryauthorityhas continuedto exploita favorable‘liquidityeffect’
environmentby generatinga seriesof reserveinnovationsas describedabove. As a
“Figures 4C, 4D, 8A, and 8B of Pagan and Robertson (1994).
15consequence,a shifi froma low inflationto a
and remainsthereafter. However,the reserve
high inflationregimetakesplace in periodt+l
supplyimovation is assumedto take placein
periodt as before. Thisscenariois representedby the sequence{S(t-4)= S(t-3)= .. = S(t)=
L, S(t+l) = s(t+2) = ....=H}, and will be referredto as the switch(LIH).
Figure5 comparesthe resultingcumulativechangesin the fundsrate to those cases
when the regimeremainsin H and L throughout for the same unt)r~. The switch (LIH) is
associatedwith the largestincreasein the finds rate out of the threecases. It even surpasses
the increasein the regimeH case. Six months after the shock (i.e., in period t+7), the
cumulative increase in the interest rate in the switch (LIH) case is aboutthree times larger
than that in the regimeH case. That is, the rise in the interestrate in the periodfollowinga
transitionfromregimeL to H is evenlargerthan the increasein the rate whenregimeH
remainsin place throughout.Thisextraincreasein the rate can be thoughtof as an inflation
penalty,or an addedcost of enteringa high inflationregime.
Symmetrically,we can considerthe case of switch(1-?IL).Supposethe economyhas
been in a high inflationregime.or regimeH,
successfilly conveyedits intentionto restrain
forawhile but the monetaryauthorityhas
inflationin the fiture. As a consequence,a
shifi froma high to low inflationregimetakesplace in periodt+l and remainsthereafter.
This scenariois representedby the sequence{S(t-4)= S(t-3)= .. = S(t)= H, S(t+l) = S(t+2)
= ....= L}.
Figure 6 compares the resulting cumulative changes in
when the regime remains in H and L throughout. The switch
the fids rate to those cases
(HIL) is associatedwith the
largestdecreasein the rate out of the three cases.even surpassingthe fall in the regimeL
16
lcase. Six months after the shock (i.e., in period t+7), the cumulative decrease in the interest
rate associated with the switch (HIL) case is about20 timesthat of the regimeH case. That
is, the magnitude of a fall in the interest rate in the period immediately following a transition
from regime H to L is even largerthan that of a decreasein the rate in the regimeL period.
This can be thoughtof as a deflationbonus,or an addedbenefitof enteringthe low inflation
regime.
Thesedynamicpropertiesof the estimatedmodelare indeedeconomicallysensible.
An identicalimovation in moneygeneratesa rising interestrate soonerduringhigh
inflationaryperiodsthan duringlow inflationperiods. Furthermore,the precedinganalysis
indicatesthat interestrate has to rise by a largeamountas the economyenters into a high
inflation(regime)periodafierbeingin a low inflationperiodfor awhile. That is, the net
increasein the rate followingan innovationin moneyduringsucha transitionperiodis much
largerthan the increasein the rate causedby the samemoneyinnovationwhenhigh inflation
has been in place throughout. This is intuitivebecauseboth a higherinflationexpectation
and inflationrisk premiawill be incorporatedinto interestratesforthe firsttime duringsuch
a transitionperiod. The converseholds. That is, the interestrate fallsby a largeamount
with the onsetof a low inflationperiodafier a stretchof high inflation.
‘80necould interpretthis result in the followingway, Supposethe economy has been in a low
inflation regime for awhile. Agents would accumulate a large real balance as the low inflation
environmentis favorable for holding money. Supposethe economyunexpectedlyenters into a high
inflationregime,which is expectedto persist for a while. Then,everyonewill try to reducetheir real
balanceholdings.This will be possibleonly when there is a largerun-up in price levels,perhapsmore
thanwhatwouldbe the case iftheeconomyhad beenin an inflationaryregimeforthe wholetime. The
deflationarycase can be explainedby the reverseof this scenario. That is, therewill be a rushto build




relationshipsmainlyrepresentthosein the monetarypolicystance,or they representshifisin
what financialmarkets’perceivedas the prevailinginflationregime. Supposemovementsin
the interestrate and nonborrowedreservesmostlyrepresentthe Fed’sactions. In this case,
the two regimescan be readilyunderstoodas capturingthe inflationarytendencyof monetary
policy. That is, the stanceof monetarypolicy is a key determinantof a higheraverage
inflationrate associatedwithregimeH. Active intervention either to generate surprise
changes in the bds rate, or to counter reserve demand shocks, could account for the high
variability of regime H. Accordingly, the converse wilI be true for regime L. That is, both a
less inflationarymonetarypolicystanceand less activeinterventionto counterthe reserve
demandshocksdescribethe periodsbelongingto regimeL.
However,there seemsto be seeminglyobviousmismatchesif we take this
interpretation. For example,Figure2 indicatesthat the periodfromearly 1979to the end of
1982was governedby regimeH. Accordingto historicalevidence,substantialtighteningof
monetarypolicyseemedto havestartedmuchsoonerthan, say, 1982. Allowingsomelag
time in patternrecognitioncouldexplainsuch a mismatch. The estimatedtimingof regimes
is basedon a very limitedinformationset. namely,historiesof the interestrate changesand
reseme imovations. Thus,for example,the modeldoes not knowthat an increasein the
volatilityof the interestrate duringthe 1979-1982periodwas mainlydue to a suspensionof
interestrate smoothingpursuedby the Fed throughoutthe 1970s. Therefore,interpreting
periodsof regimesH and L to be capturingthe inflationarytendencyof monetarypolicy
18warrantscaution.
An alternativeinterpretationis that the two regimesmightbe capturingwhat financial
marketsperceivethe prevailinginflationregimeto be. For example,the yield on 30-year
Treasurybondsrose only graduallyuntil mid-1979,despitethe fact that relativelyhigh
inflationprevailedthroughoutthe precedingthreeyears. The implicitprice deflatorrarely
wentbelow7 percentduringthat period. This observationnotwithstanding,the public might
not havebeen sureabouthow longthe spell was goingto last (Goodfriend(1993)). This
couldexplainwhy Figure2 does not identi~ the late 1970sas a high inflationregimeperiod.
On the otherhand,there was a rapidrun-upin the long rate in rnid-1983due to a
serious‘inflationscare’. ’9 This set off the run-upin the fids rate to August 1984.
in the model’sestimateof the probabilityof high inflationregimebeing in place in
couldbe partlyexplainedby this chainof events.
The rise
1984
Observationsso far suggestthat we needmore structureto understandthe natureof
the regimesand their shifts. In particular,specifyingthe marketfor federaltids more
explicitlyshouldbe usefil if we are goingto attributethe observedchangesto those of the
monetarypolicystanceper se (Coleman,Gillesand Labadie(1994)and Hamilton(1994)).
Also,an identificationschemeproposedin Leeperand Gordon(1995)that structurally
distinguishesreservesupplyand demandshocksmightyield informativeresults.
However,the factremainsthat regimeH periodshavea significantlyhigheraverage
inflationrate comparedto regimeL periods. This suggestsa weakeror narrowersecond
‘9Goodfriend (1983)definesthe‘inflationscare’as a significantrisein long-ratesinthe absenceof an
aggressivefundsrate tightening,thus mainlyreflectingrisingexpectedlong-runinflation.
.




liquidityeffect in the contextof a bivariatereducedformrelationship.
regimechangeson the
Thestochasticregime
switchingmodelis able to capturesome statisticallyand economicallysignificantpatternsthat
are distinctacrossthe two positedregimes. Mostsignificantis the identificationof each
regimewith high and low inflationperiods.
It’salso shownthat the divergencein
across low and high inflationperiodscan be
the dynamicmoney-interestrate relationship
quitesignificant. Examinationsof dynamic
propertiesof the estimatedmodelindeedyieldeconomicallysensibleresults. In general, a
high inflation regime is associated with a stronger anticipated inflation effect. Furthermore,
results indicate that the interest rate has to rise by a large amount as the economy enters into
a high inflation (regime) period afier being in a low inflation period for awhile. That is, the
net increase in the rate following an innovation in money during such a transition period is
much largerthan the
inflationhas been in
increasein the rate causedby the samemoney innovationwhenhigh
placethroughout. This is intuitivebecauseboth a higher inflation
expectationand inflationrisk premiawill be incorporatedinto interestrates for the firsttime
duringsucha transitionperiod. The conversealso holds.Giventhese findings,the potential
regimeshift warrantsmoreattentionin fiture empiricalinvestigationsof the liquidityeffect.
However,the reducedformnatureof the analysisputs a limiton answering&her
20structuralquestions. Incorporatingmore structurein the modelspecification,parallelto the
recentdevelopmentin the conventionalliquidityeffect literature,mightbe necessaryfor
strongeridentification.
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23Table 1. Results without Common Mean: Model I
4 3
rt s ~r(St) + ~ P~(St) trt-j - P~(s~-j)l+~ b~(s~)‘nbrt-i +ct(sf)
j=1 i=0
Variable Coefficients(S= L) Coefficients(S= H)
P, 0.343(0.33) 2.248 (1.35)**
p “m(s J -0.211 (0.09)*** -1.426(0.69)**
p ‘m(SJ -0.137 (0.10)* -0.105(1.31)
p 2m (SJ 0.031(0.10) 0.175 (0.55)





***,**,~d * reswctivelydenotecasessignificantat 1,5 and 10percentlevel.
24Table 2. Resu16 witi CommonMean:Model II
i
Variable Coefficients (S = L) Coefficients (S = H)
P,= v. 0.259 (0.18) * 14.25 (3.14) ***
p ‘m(s,) -0.229 (0.09) *** -0.004 (0.10)
~ ‘m(s ,) -0.115 (0.10) 0.539 (0.36)
p 2m(s J 0.023 (0.09) -0.310 (0,48)
B ‘In(s t) 0.042 (0.08) 0.658 (0.35) **




*** ** ~d * respectively denote cases significant at 1,5 and 10percentlevel. 9 7
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Figure6: CumulativeEffectofOne-timeReservehnovation onFYFF;S(t)=L
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